Abstract
In situation where commercial piracy is almost costless technologically, copyright producer’s demand for monitoring copyright infringement may vary in intensity depending on factors like market size, the range of vertical differentiation in preference, and deviation in quality of the pirated product from the original version. While the demand of the copyright producer is always for monitoring to ensure monopoly market to her, the social objective may very well warrant a softer attitude to piracy, provided this does not deny the copyright producer her normal profit.
JEL classification: D 43
Keywords: piracy, copyright producer, competitive fringe, vertical differentiation, sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, monitoring, social surplus.
Full paper at
https://docs.google.com/open?id=0B12WRGg6cZLBYmQwODJiODQtOWJhYy00MDI5LTlhM2YtOGNlMTRlOGIwMWQw
